새와 생명의 터 -

대한민국 가금류 독감: 또 시작이다…
글: 나일 무어스 박사, 새와생명의터, 2014년 6월 24일

“이전의 발생한 H5H1 HPAI에서와 같이 불균형적으로 야생 조류를 바이러스의 근원지와 확산의 원인으로 비난하는 것은 덜 효율적인 질병 통제 활동과 바이러스의 잠재적 확산으로 이어질 수 있습니다.야생조류 의 역할과 조류 독감에 대해 고려할 때 미디어, 학계 및인간/동물보건 기관은 책임감 있게 행동해야 하며 또한 충분한 증거가 없을 시에는 바이러스의 근원지로서 철새를 지목하는 것은 피해야 합니다.”

발췌: 조류 인플루엔자 및 야생조류 학술대책위원회 성명문: 2014년 1월 28일 발표

6월 중에 국내의 가금류 농가에서 몇 건의 H5N8 조류독감 (“가금류 독감”)이 새로이 발발했다는 보도가 있었다. 국내 굴지의 영자 신문인 코리아 타임즈에 따르면 첫 발병지는 충남 홍성 (Na 2014)이며; 남으로는 무안으로; 현재는 대구에서, 남동쪽으로 (Kim 2014)으로 이동한다고 했다. 그런 단정을 뒷받침할 증거가 부족함에도 불구하고, 국내 언론은 여전히 이 가금류 독감의 발병을 철새의 이동과 연관 시키고 있다. 그 한 예로 6월 18일 “많은 이들은 철새가 원인인 것으로 보고 있으므로 감염경로를 추적하기 위한 조사가 진행 중이다”라고 김세정 기자는 전하기도 했다.

이 질병에 대하여 조류 인플루엔자 및 야생조류 학술대책위원회(약칭. ‘AI 학술대책위’)와 같은 전문 기구의 명쾌한 권고가 있는데도 이에 위배되는 오보를 언론 측에서 의도적으로 일반 시민들에게 전한다고 보기는 상당히 어려울 것 같다. 이것은 다양하고도 복잡한 환경적, 경제적 및 공공의 안전에 미칠 영향을 가진 사안이다. H5N8 가금류 독감으로 축산 농민들은 경제적으로 큰 타격을 입으며, 폐기 처분으로 인해 덩달아 엄청난 수의 가금류가 불필요한 수난을 겪게 되었다. 더욱이 고병원성 H5N1은 역시 가금류 산업(그리고 최근 북한에서도 발발)을 통해 발견되었고 퍼졌으며 새들에게 뿐만 아니라 사람들에게도 위험하다.

그럼에도 불구하고, 이곳 대한민국에서 질병 확산의 원인을 철새에게로 돌리는 믿음은 연이어 발발하는 질병 그 자체만큼이나 끈질긴 것 같으며 몇 언론의 보도는 이러한 믿음을 계속 부추기는 듯하다. 과거의 발병에 이어 다시 1월에 H5N8이 한창이었을 때도, 국내의 많은 정부 관리들과 언론은 야생 오리와 거위에게 신속히 책임을 돌렸다. 야생 조류는 어디로부터인지 국내로 바이러스를 옮기며; 그 새들이 다시 오염방지 시설 농가까지 뚫고 들어가서 가금류들을 감염시키며; 그리고 나서 같은 질병을 그들이 날아가는 전국 곳곳으로 계속 퍼뜨린다는 주장을 어떤 까닭에서인지 계속한다.

새와생명의터는 수 년 간 최상의 정보를 알리기 위해 최선을 다해 왔으며 되풀이하여 (공개 회의나 공개 서한 및 비공개로 언론 및 주요 공직자들과의 접촉, 특히 올해 1월과 6월에는 코리아타임즈를 통해), 지금까지 야생조류가 가금류의 감염원이라는 주장을 뒷받침하는 그 어떠한 과학적 근거가 지금까지 없음을 명백히 시사하는 노력을 해 왔다. 전 세계의 대다수의 전문가들과 언론은 이것이 가금류산업에서 처음 시작된 질병이라는 것을 이미 이해하고 있다. 지난 주만 하더라도 BBC 뉴스는 조류독감 바이러스가 지속되는 곳은 전적으로 규모를 갖춘 가금류 농가임을 확인하는 연구를 발표하였다. 지난 1월로 돌아가서, 세계적인 질병 관련 선두적인 (세계보건기구와 세계식량농업국의 대표자들 포함) 전문가들로 구성된 AI 학술대책위는 “지금껏 국제적인 야생조류 감시 활동에서는 야생조류 사이에서 이 H5N8 조류독감의 경향을 감지한 바가 없다”고 분명하게 밝혔다.

국내 주류 언론의 보도에 대해: H5N8은 대한민국에서 발발하기(이것은 가금류농가로부터 배출되는 감염된 오물과 야생조류가 접촉한 후 발생했을 가능성 추측) 전에는 야생조류들 사이에서는 발견된 바가 없다는 점을 다시금 알려야겠다. 더욱이 우리가 정확히 예상했듯이, 번식지를 향해 그들이 이동한 북쪽의 주변 국가에서는 질병이 발발하지 않았다. 오히려 새들이 떠난 뒤 국내에서는 계속 진행되었고 일본 남쪽에서 발병하였다.

그렇다면 국내에서는 왜 계속 발병하고 있는 것이며, 발병 후에 훨씬 신속히 통제하는 많은 다른 나라들에 비해 국내의 진압이 늦은 이유는 무엇인가? 발병에 대한 언론의 오보와 “발병 통제 활동과 잠재적인 바이러스 확산에 덜 치중하고 있음”이 관련 있다는 AI 학술대책위의 언급은 주목할 만한 가치가 있다. 미비한 대응이 어떤 이유에서든, 야생조류에게 발병 원인을 돌리거나; 습지를 차단하고; 바이러스를 근절하지도 못하는 소독약을 새들에게 살포하는 일은 지금이라도 없어져야 한다. 오히려 국내에서 야생오리와 거위가 이동이 가장 많았던 시점이 석 달이나 지난 후에도, H5N8은 여전히 국내 가금류 사이에 집요하게 남아있었다. 그리고 다시 농장에서 농장으로 퍼졌다. 하다못해 가장 최근에 발발했던 대구의 감염지인 “그 농가는 6월 14일 홍성의 한 농가에서 새끼 거위 107마리를 사들여 온 것으로 알려졌다” (Kim 2014).

우리나라의 새들과 축산 농가를 위해서 그리고 치명적인 질병 발발을 피하는데 도움을 주고자 우리는 언론과 정부 관계자에게 권하고자 한다. AI 학술대책위와 전 세계의 선두적인 전문가들의 조언과 권고를 경청할 것과 부디 책임 있게 행동해 줄 것을 삼가 촉구하는 바이다.

참고문헌

Gallagher, J. 2014. Bird flu “danger zones’ mapped. June 17^th 2014, BBC News.
Accessed at: http://www.bbc.com/news/health-27866405
Kim S-J. 2014. New bird flu case in Daegu fuels concerns for nationwide spread. July 18^th, 2014, The Korea Times.
Accessed at: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/06/116_159387.html
Na J-J. 2014. Bird flu hits Hoengseong. June 15^th 2014, The Korea Times.
Accessed at: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/06/116_159164.html
조류 인플루엔자 및 야생조류 학술대책위원회 성명문 January 2014. 전문: http://www.birdskorea.org/Our_Work/H5N1/Downloads/Scientific-Task-Force-on-Avian-Influenza-and-Wild-Birds-H5N8-HPAI-28-January-2014-v2-1-kor.pdf

Birds Korea and Poultry Flu (January 2014)

Birds Korea's thinking on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Poultry Flu has been expressed in a number of position statements and mails to relevant organisations since 2005. Again, as of January 2014, our position remains largely unchanged. While a very few cases of Poultry Flu in the past have infected and then apparently been spread by wild birds, chronic Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza is caused by the poultry industry and is maintained by the poultry industry. Human sickness caused by strains of AI have also been traced back to human contact with poultry and captive birds and not through contact with wild birds. In the latest series of outbreaks (in January 2014), evidence again points to the poultry industry as being both the source of the highly pathogenic strain of the H5N8 virus and of its spread – from farm to farm and province to province.

As in previous outbreaks, domestic media reporting of the latest outbreak of Highly Pathogenic H5N8 Avian Influenza has largely been inaccurate, misleading and in some cases irresponsible. Many have ignored the science and blamed the disease on wild birds, most especially the Baikal Teal Anas formosa.

We therefore urge visitors to this page to read and share the excellent Position Statement released by the Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds (on January 28^th, 2014) and to visit our archived materials. Together, these should provide ample reassurance that the outbreaks will be best controlled by improving biosecurity of farms.

조류 인플루엔자 및 야생조류 학술대책위원회성명문, 2014년 1월 28일

PDFs:

영어 버전

한국어 버전

Please find below some of our own (archived) statements (most from 2005-2007, with the focus on H5N1), statements on "bird flu" made by disease specialists (including on H7N9 in 2013), and a list of links to some of our previous statements and mails and links to statements by other organisations.

From 2013:

Yet Another Strain of Poultry Flu: H7N9

Specialist Statement on H7N9 Avian Influenza in China: April 15th 2013

H7N9 Update as of April 10, 2013
The novel strain of avian influenza (H7N9) infecting birds and humans in China has been found in over 20 people in four provinces of the country and has caused 8 human deaths so far. So far, the virus does not appear to be highly pathogenic in birds, hence, making it more challenging to monitor and control. It has been found in domestic chickens, domestic ducks, domestic pigeons and domestic quail and has led to the culling of poultry as a precautionary measure. To date, H7N9 has not been found in any wild birds. Currently, it appears that the internal genes of this strain are most similar to AI virus circulating in domestic poultry, and as well, the N9 segment appears most closely related to virus found in domestic poultry. Only the H7 segment appears to be closely related to virus found in wild waterfowl. The continuing emergence of these new strains in this region is concerning and most probably relates to the recent rapid expansion in poultry industry and changing agroecology. Risks to people, livelihoods and biodiversity conservation are significant and need quantifying.

The IUCN SSC Wildlife Health Specialist Group encourages any collaboration to assist in understanding the origins, distribution, and potential spread of this new strain of influenza. Precautions to prevent the accidental spread of this new strain from domestic poultry to wild birds or the environment need to be implemented urgently, and attention to the safety of emerging livestock production systems in relationship to pathogen evolution is needed.

Respectfully,
Billy Karesh and Richard Kock, Co-Chairs
Catherine Machalaba and Lisa Starr, Program Officers
IUCN Wildlife Health Specialist Group
WHSG@EcoHealthAlliance.org
Twitter: @IUCNWildHealth
Facebook: IUCN SSC Wildlife Health Specialist Group

From 2005:

Rather than just assuming that wild birds are behind the spread of H5N1, we urge our members to ask media, decision-makers and other conservation organisations:

In what way does a similar genetic make up in the virus in birds in Poyang and birds at Qinghai constitute evidence that wild birds moved the virus from Poyang to Qinghai? Is it not possible that they could simply have been infected by the same strain of virus at a similar stage of that virus's evolution? That the virus in Turkey is also similar seems more to suggest that the virus was carried mechanically across China, and through to Turkey - as we all understand that there is not a single wild bird species that migrates in the way the virus spread last summer, yet there is plenty of trade that moves across Asia.
Of direct relevance to this: in which conditions would a virus be most likely to evolve/not evolve? In relatively stable conditions when the virus can always find a host (e.g. poultry) or in the various different environments encountered by stressed migrant birds? Why so little evolution of the virus detected between Poyang, Qinghai and Turkey?
No bird species is believed to migrate from Pohang to Qinghai and onto Europe (and now Nigeria), but spread by domino effect in wild birds also seems a rather poor hypothesis. If the domino effect was in place, then why would the spread be so one-directional? Why would outbreaks not have spread back eastward as well? Why no outbreaks in wild birds after Qinghai and Mongolia here in Korea? Or in India? (As an aside, why is this negative data not considered of significance, and included in discussions?).
Why in Poyang was there apparently no outbreak of disease in wild birds, yet at Qinghai there was? It might be the seasonal stresses involved; and/or it might be that birds occupying territories are less likely to move out from such territories once established, thus increasing risk of exposure, and/or it could be that the infection was at a different stage between sites.
It is clear that as the virus was so similar genetically that it was not due to some major evolutionary change in the virus itself.
Some studies have suggested that recovering domesticated mallards shed less virus than when incapacitated by disease. What seems evident is that the responses at Poyang and Qinghai were different (no outbreak in wild birds compared to severe outbreak). This alone at least suggests that the same birds from Poyang, unable to infect birds there, would be unable to infect birds at Qinghai. It seems unlikely that this is simply a matter of resistance: so few birds have been shown to be resistant to HPAI H5N1, and migratory birds are turning over at key wetlands all the time.
Would a reasonable hypothesis rather be that the recovering waterbirds had been exposed to the highly virulent virus some time before (i.e. not at Poyang); that when they arrived there (whether over a short distance or not) they did not shed enough virus to infect other wild birds? At Qingahi, exposure by waterbirds to the same strain of virus from a new local source then created an immediate outbreak in wild birds. Over time, this petered out as birds avoided infected areas, and the virus lost its virulence (in line with our understanding of natural selection). Background research reveals manure-enriched fish-farms at the same lake at Qinghai, a nearby Buddhist temple, and significant concentrations of poultry in local areas: all likely sources of virus?
The genetic evidence suggests shared origin: it does nothing to reveal how wild birds can actually infect poultry. We can easily see how wild birds have become infected though contact with other wild birds (e.g. at Qinghai and in Mongolia); we can see how wild birds have become infected through contact with poultry or contaminated environment (non-migratory bird species in Japan and Korea, perhaps Tree Sparrows in China); but are wild birds somehow supposed to become infected, then fly into chicken coops etc, before flying off again? In some areas, it is clear that there are free range poultry, and some opportunities for infection of poultry by wild birds (and again, vice versa, as with free-range duck rearing at Poyang and elsewhere), but how can a Great Crested Grebe on a lake in Novosibirisk for example be supposed to infect a flock of turkeys kept in a village? And how can this kind of improbable method of infection have happened not once, but tens or even now hundreds of times?

Birds Korea takes a very conservative, well-traveled line on H5N1. We believe that the movement of poultry and caged birds or contaminants from China, especially by road and rail, has led to an explosive near-one-directional movement, from areas with widespread (endemic) H5N1 and asymptomatic poultry into areas with a demand for cheap poultry products and limited control and documentation. We all know (for we have been saying it for years) that wild birds know no borders...So this presence or absence of border controls and strictly-enforced regulations can affect only poultry and caged birds. It is a major reason why the virus has not impacted Western Europe yet, nor several countries in Far East Asia; nor Australasia; nor North America. For such countries have much stricter controls on poultry and caged bird imports. This is why H5N1 is likely to continue to impact developing economies more significantly, countries where resources are more limited and where regulations and controls on movements of animals are less strict (Indonesia, Viet Nam, China, Turkey etc).

In summary, for the sake of the birds and for the sake of people, H5N1 should not be sensationalized or reported irresponsibly.

The spread (and method of spread) of the virus needs to be reported accurately and with balance, and specialists from many fields need to cooperate more efficiently to exchange relevant information openly and freely.

Based only on the best available information, the public and decision-makers then need to develop appropriate responses.

For now, these need to include improved biosecurity (preventing poultry from infecting wild birds and their habitats); improved regulation of trade in poultry and caged birds (especially in the understanding that some species can carry HPAI H5N1 asymptomatically); and greater protection of wild bird populations, in line with national laws or international conventions.

Assessment of virus movement across continents: using northern pintails as a test
Dirk V. Derksen, Alaska Science Center, 4210 University Drive, Anchorage, AK 99508

A CMC Misson report is available as downloadable .pdf document:
Understanding the potential role of wild birds in the epidemiology of the current HPAI outbreaks in the Republic of Korea 13-21 December 2006

On December 7th 2006 Nial Moores, Director of Birds Korea, made a presentation to a symposium on Avian Influenza at the Migratory Birds Observation centre in Gunsan, organized by UNDP-GEF and local bird conservation and citizens groups.

For the text please go to H5N1 Report presented by Nial Moores, Birds Korea

Birds Korea statements:

Birdlife International's position statements:

Other news

Informed additional (lively!) discussion and opinion at:

drmartinwilliams.com/forum